While many studies of the web and related technologies of communication have focused on its use, there has been little engagement with the structural properties of the web and related technologies from a broadly social theoretic point of view. This article analyses pressures on the technological development of the web from the perspective of the Habermasian concepts of colonization and juridification. On this analysis, legal and quasi-legal tendencies can be seen to restrict the uses and development of the structures of the world wide web, as I will show with the use of several case studies.
Frankfurt School, where there is an inevitable and inescapable logic of technological development rooted in the socio-economic logic of capitalism. For example, Adorno and Horkheimer (1997: 121) note that the technological rationale of domination 'is the result not of a law of movement in technology as such but of its function in today's economy '. However Andrew Feenberg (1999) has argued that technology is open to continual and unexpected development and alteration; technology is a contested domain, with the primary rationalization not necessarily dictating the outcome of secondary rationalizations. Although we might say that technologies are shaped, we must say that a technology's material properties (which I call basic structural properties; see Salter, 2004) differ from thing to thing, with one of the differences being whether they are open or closed to further shaping in use. In the language of the social construction of technology approach (Pinch and Bijker, 1984) , closure refers to the stabilization of a technology around a particular use or set of uses. Kline and Pinch (1996) have added that technology often becomes closed around a dominant form, but that interpretative flexibility may challenge that closure.
I have argued elsewhere (Salter, 2004 ) that some technologies, and the internet in particular, are open not only to shaping, but also to a variety of forms of use that, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, recognizes that to understand a technology is to understand its use(s). It also factors in political economy in explaining how some uses may make demands of the structure which may prevent other uses. On this understanding, certain uses may be afforded, 1 but affordances are dynamic, shifting and subject to general patterns of social relations. Thus, what I would most readily add to the concept of affordances is that:
(1) technologies are the result of innovations with 'uses in mind'; (2) technologies change over time; and (3) there are conflicting interests for which these innovations and changes take place.
'Forms of use' does not refer simply to affordances, nor to the ability of users to adapt to affordances. Rather it refers to the ability of users (which includes businesses, governments, educational organizations, as well as the variety of commercial and non-commercial individuals and groups) to develop ways of using a technology, which are associated with their interests and to try to influence the technological structure accordingly. It is thus that we can say that a communications technology must be shaped or formed to enable, for example, a Habermasian communicative-ethical discourse mechanism, to enable e-commerce, or both. Of course, this is not to say that a communications technology can be simply shaped in any way, for background constraints apply, such as material constraints, in the form of social and economic inequalities upon actors, which restrict their use and the ability of those uses to impact on the structure.
In this article, I present a Habermasian theoretical framework on which to base an evaluation of some of the processes of shaping web technologies. The elements of Habermas' theory that I have used in the framework refer mainly to his concepts of colonization and juridification, although they must be considered in relation to his (perhaps better known) theories of democracy and political struggle. I then go on to explain the juridification of the world wide web and the institutions that govern these processes. In view of the concept of technological closure, I argue that what has been referred to as a 'citizen's view' (for example, McChesney, 1999; Rheingold, 2000;  or the work of the Association for Progressive Communications) of the internet and associated technologies must seek to impress itself on the web before the process of juridification closes the technology to such uses.
ROUTES OF COLONIZATION
Habermas' critical theory sought to provide answers to the pessimism of the earlier Frankfurt School and to what he saw as Marx's inability to explain social change fully. Habermas ' (1979) thesis is that changes in the mode of production alone cannot explain the evolution of society. Rather, the rationalization of the lifeworld and the development of rationalized normative structures takes place through social learning processes that develop in response to systemic crises. In turn, the definition of a problem (which may become, or stem from, a crisis) and the method of resolution may be understood from the perspective of the lifeworld or from the perspective of the political and economic subsystems. The lifeworld is a background cultural resource which provides a basis for meaning and understanding. The political and economic subsystems operate on the basis of self-sustaining instrumental and technical rationality. This contrast results in a tension between conflicting demands, for example, between the need for stable employment from the lifeworld perspective and the need for a dynamic economy and flexible labour from the economic subsystem perspective. Habermas argues that the system is animated by instrumental or technical rationality and the lifeworld by communicative rationality. When the lifeworld becomes 'colonized' by instrumental rationality, social pathologies may arise. Habermas refers to this process of 'colonization' where instrumental rationality 'surges beyond the bounds of the economy and state into other, communicatively structured areas of life and achieves dominance there at the expense of moral-practical and aesthetic-practical rationality ' (1987: 304) . This process results in a situation where the subsystems of economy and bureaucratic state administration are placed in opposition to private and public spheres of life. Systemic colonization does not go as far as to replace communicative rationality, rather, it disempowers Salter: Colonization tendencies in the development of the WWW it: steering mechanisms disempower communicative action's 'validity basis so as to provide the legitimate possibility of redefining at will spheres of action oriented to mutual understanding into action situations stripped of lifeworld contexts and no longer directed to achieving consensus' (Habermas, 1987: 311) .
'Colonization' is not a simple process; where there is colonization, there is resistance. Indeed, the lifeworld/system relation becomes 'juridified' (Habermas, 1987) . Juridification refers to 'the tendency toward an increase in formal (positive or written) law that can be observed in modern society ' (1987: 357) , although Habermas uses the concept specifically as a method of analysing the development of society under capitalism (Habermas, 1987: 357-62) . For Habermas, juridification has taken place in stages, beginning with the organization of relations between private persons in a market economy, through to the development of civil, political and social rights. However, this process is ambivalent or, as Habermas puts it, Janus-faced. The later stage of juridification, which saw the establishment of the socialdemocratic welfare state, 'serve[d] the goal of social integration', but at the same time promoted 'disintegration of life-relations . . . through legalized social intervention' (Habermas, 1987: 364) , that is, the expansion of the competencies of the administrative state replaced many of those of the lifeworld. For our purpose, Habermas's notion of juridification provides three insights into social relations within capitalism. As noted, the process of social development is ambiguous, providing the resources for social integration as well as fragmentation. Further, the success of the development of the social-democratic welfare state illustrates how the lifeworld can juridify to support and defend itself against colonization by systemic imperatives. Finally, perhaps contrary to Habermas' (1987) own formulation, the process is not linear or necessarily 'progressive' in stages. Since he formulated the theory, the socialist 'threat' of the USSR has disappeared and the return of classic liberalism has eroded much of the welfare state in many western democracies. It is in relation to this latter point that we can see that although there have been some calls for a social policy for the internet (for example, Calabrese and Bochert, 1996) , in this spirit of classical liberalism little has been done to this end.
In relation to the world wide web, the concepts of colonization and juridification allow us to analyse not simply the increase of commercial content or information retrieval mechanisms (see Introna and Nissenbaum, 2000; McChesney, 2002; Patelis, 2000) , but also the legal and quasi-legal demands that these forms of use make upon the basic structural properties themselves; for as Lessig (1999) notes, this technological code acts like law. Indeed, Lessig's thoughts on code-as-law usefully illustrate some of Habermas' ideas on colonization and juridification. However, Habermas' concepts enable a far broader tool with which to contextualize and analyse New Media & Society 7(3) the complexity of political, economic and social relations more generally. Certainly, we can see the technological development of the web and the internet through the perspective of juridification, in the sense that the technology itself has relations encoded and our relation to and use of it is subject to juridification. Historical precedent shows us that affordances available in the early stages of technological development and implementation, for example, television, radio or the printing press, become reduced as dominant relations are encoded (see for example, Curran and Seaton, 1991; Winston, 1998) . Indeed, there is a good deal of emergent juridification of the web in law courts and standards organizations. It is this process that, against the backdrop of claims of the web and the internet as 'democratic media', I turn to analyse in relation to the world wide web (WWW) and the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C).
Before moving on, some preliminary theoretical clarifications are necessary. First, Habermas' understanding of different forms of rationality (on which the distinction between the technocratic system and lifeworld is based) may be considered too simplistic. His theory of rationality may well have challenged the pessimism of the Frankfurt School, but as Andrew Feenberg (1999: 159) charges, it implicity charges technology with being 'nonsocial, neutral and formal'. Indeed, Habermas analytically separates value spheres (objective, social, subjective), neglecting the social values of designers, engineers and the social context of technological innovation. Second, 'colonization tendencies' does not refer to a complete or total process. As mentioned above, colonization and juridification are ambiguous processes and set in tension against resistance (for an account of the continued resistance to the commercialization of the internet, see Hauben, 1999) . The example of the W3C below, is an example not of an outcome but of a process and a tension within that process. Finally, Habermas' separation of lifeworld and the economic and political subsystems is grounded in his rejection of the mode of production, which, as I shall illustrate in the conclusion, may limit the utility of colonization and juridification as analytical tools.
THE WORLD WIDE WEB I mention above that the internet allows a variety of forms of use, but that some forms of use make demands on the technological structure that disable others. At the same time, however, we might consider that some forms of use share features in common. For example, according to Habermas (1996) the informal public sphere is lucid, free-flowing and open. It was suggested by Habermas (1989) that the (bourgeois) public sphere was so due to its coorigination with the free market. Accordingly, we might understand freemarket capitalism as lucid, free-flowing and open; at least this is what the rhetoric claims. However, the colonization thesis would suggest that to Salter: Colonization tendencies in the development of the WWW secure commercial space entails the incorporation of other, competing, space and forms of use. This closure may even close off contrary forms of use, either by legal recourse externally, or by using the standards bodies themselves, which we may refer to as juridification. To illustrate the incomplete process of colonization, attention will be paid to an internet application, the WWW. This brief study will focus on legal challenges to the use of structural components of the WWW on the one hand, and on the development of its structural properties through its standards body on the other.
In order to understand the development of the WWW, we must begin not from the position of what the latter is, but from that of its affordances and from the perspective of its designer.
2 Although Tim Berners-Lee's (1989) initial proposal for the web was specific to the needs of physicians in the Conseil Européen Pour la Researche Nucleaire (CERN) laboratory, his reflections on the former's development are instructive. In 1999, BernersLee complained:
I wanted the web to be what I call an interactive space where everybody can edit. And I started saying 'interactive' and then I read in the media that the web was great because it was 'interactive', meaning you could click. This was not what I meant by interactivity, so I started calling it 'intercreativity' . . . What I mean is being creative with others. A few fundamental rules make this possible. As you can read, so you should be able (given the authority) to write. (Berners-Lee, 1999) So the WWW may have become, but was not intended to be, a passive medium. Users here should be defined not as passive recipients, but as active participants, thus breaking down the distinction between author and reader/ broadcaster and viewer. The web was intended to facilitate the generation and sharing of knowledge:
It had to be not only easy to 'browse', but also easy to express oneself . . . Anything in the web can be quickly learned by a person and any knowledge you see as being missing from the web can be quickly added. The web should be a medium for the communication between people: communication through shared knowledge. (Berners-Lee, 1998) The idea of constant dialogue was supposed to be built into the web. The generation of information and knowledge was supposed to take place as an ongoing social practice, distinct from other media forms, such as the press and television:
The basic ideas [sic] of the web is that [sic] an information space through which people can communicate, but communicate in a special way: communicate by sharing their knowledge in a pool. The idea was not just that it should be a big browsing medium. The idea was that everybody would be New Media & Society 7(3) putting their ideas in, as well as taking them out. This is not supposed to be a glorified television channel. (Berners-Lee, 1999) Although some, such as Ted Nelson, 3 may question the web's interactive capacities at the outset from a 'technical' point of view, it is not the intention here to account for technical developments as such. However, the demands made upon the architecture of the web, such as the separation of the client and server and of information and the browser, come from a variety of sources, but it is not unreasonable to suggest that the dominant mode of production has a role. This is confirmed by the commercialization of the internet from 1988 onwards, 4 the Internet Society's call to 'dedicate ourselves to work towards the development of authentication methods and systems capable of supporting electronic commerce through the Internet' (RFC 3271; see also RFC 1192) 5 and the Advance Research Projects Agency's ongoing attempts to 'enable the rapid construction of internetenabled applications for electronic commerce, command and control and virtual enterprises ' (Object Services and Consulting, Inc, 1996) . In regard to the web, the low levels of interactivity of Shockwave and many database standards have more to do with the integrity of data (whether corporate image, copyrighted information or prices) than with postmodern forms of interaction. Indeed, it is the contention that capitalist property relations colonize the web and the internet and become a significant consideration in their development and use. However, pressures on development and use stem from 'external' law, as well as from the development of standards themselves. First I will give two examples of how standard uses of HTML are limited by 'external' pressures, before turning to how the W3C has experienced colonization tendencies.
Deep links and frames
Hyperlinking is one of the structural properties of the world wide web. The hyperlink is, and has always been, essential to hypertext; it is one of the reasons that we can refer to a 'web'. However, the form of the hyperlink has been subject to contestation. Linking webpages and websites traditionally reflected a social relationship between persons sharing an interest, as can be seen in the 'web ring' phenomenon. Linking may be viewed also as a way of freely relating relevant information for those who have an interest in it. Links were unproblematic from the legal viewpoint and were seen as a good way of making connections between people with common interests. However, these simple, 'lifeworld' relations became questioned as ecommerce and copyrighted information developed; to a degree links have now come to be regarded as a threat to commercial integrity. Indeed, the use of hyperlinks has been met with legal challenge on numerous occasions and almost always in relation to the protection of commercial interests. Perhaps the most widely reported court case relating to the status of Salter: Colonization tendencies in the development of the WWW hyperlinks was that of Ticketmaster v. Microsoft (CD Cal. USD 97-3055 (1997) ). In this instance, Microsoft had made deep links into Ticketmaster's website, 6 bypassing Ticketmaster's homepage and, therefore, the main depository of advertising. Further to this, Microsoft's bypassing of the Ticketmaster homepage meant that the destination would seem to have more relation to Microsoft than Ticketmaster, thus impinging on Ticketmaster's image. Although the case was settled out of court, it seems unlikely that such uncertainty can remain the norm on the web. Indeed, in July 2002, the Danish Newspaper Publishers Association set something of a precedent by winning a case to ban others linking to any page other than their homepage (Wired, 2002) . Of course, there is a strong argument for maintaining the integrity of certain forms of information, but when this becomes legally protected to such an extent that it cannot be linked, problems arise that strip the web of much of its appeal over other forms of media. Given the number of cases involving disputes over the legitimacy of links, it is likely that there will be a resolution to this issue one way or another. It seems, however, that the main source of law in this instance will be in the form of a private contract between the website and the user. With the increase in the quantity and proportion of commercial content and its concentration in the hands of a few commercial companies, hyperlinking may well become reduced outside the realm of commercial relations. That is, hyperlinking may well become a commercial relation. On the other hand, an earlier court case, ACLU of Georgia v. Miller (977 F.Supp 1228 (ND Ga. 1997)) resulted in the protection of non-commercial speech on the internet in relation to hyperlinking. Nevertheless, as information becomes commodified, commercial relations will be imposed. Further to this, as I illustrate below, there have been attempts to make provisions for the standardized commercialization of web standards which may well have extended to hyperlinks.
Framing is a method of displaying a webpage within another webpage based on the HTML 'frame' tag. This method of displaying information can be used to allow access to several sources from a central location. For example, a news section of a website might use frames to display a number of links to newspapers on the left-hand side of the page (say, the Guardian, the Independent and The Times), which load into the right-hand frame. Framing can prove very useful for websites attempting to provide politically relevant information to citizens or indeed to critically contrast information, news and opinion from a range of sources. All of these are what we might consider to be acceptable critical activities in a democracy. However, such activities depend on a certain arrangement of relations and configuration of space that enables access, mobility and other features of a public sphere. Such provisions have also met with protest from economic interests, because the frame confuses ownership over content and reduces the ability of the New Media & Society 7(3) framed site to present itself. As an illustration of this contestation, in 1997 the Washington Post, Times Mirror, Time Warner, CNN, Dow Jones and Reuters New Media took legal action against a news aggregate, TotalNews, for framing their websites. TotalNews had linked to these sites by using frames to provide a wide-ranging and comparative news service. However, this was seen as contrary to the commercial interests of the news services to which it was being linked. The case was settled out of court, whereby TotalNews agreed only to frame sites that had given express permission, and the plaintiffs agreed to issue 'linking licences' to TotalNews so long as they did not use frames (see The Washington Post et al. v. TotalNews, Inc. et al. (SDNY 97-1190 ; for a summary, see CNET, 1997) . While this case involved commercial organizations as both plaintiff and defendant, it is indicative of the juridification of relations and standards by economic interests. Thus framing has been restricted by intellectual property law and private contracts between the websites and the user.
It may be consistently argued that Berners-Lee's vision of the web be regarded as antithetical to the whole concept of intellectual property and patents (see Berners-Lee, 1997) . Indeed, the potential of a hypertextual web is greatly reduced when its structure and content becomes fenced off and accessible only to those with the ability to pay. We see here a tension between democratic forms of use concerned with the lifeworld and systemic forms of use concerned with economic profitability. More pressing concerns arise when the standards organizations themselves are considered, for they affect the development of the technology and may impose closure and limit use.
COLONIZATION TENDENCIES WITHIN THE W3C
Where legal recourse is unpopular, expensive, time consuming and, most importantly, reactive rather than proactive, there are other means by which the demands of the economic subsystem can be made and, to a degree, acted upon. It is in this sense that standards organizations can be a vessel for the interests of the economic subsystem. The W3C is the standards organization for the web and runs on the 'rough consensus, running code' philosophy of internet-based standards bodies. Despite 'inclusive' provisions, the W3C is very much a benign dictatorship, with its founder (and creator of the web), Tim Berners-Lee, ultimately in control of development (see W3C, 2004) . The organization, like other standards bodies, is a professional member-based body. Each member has a seat on the advisory committee and may access member-only information; employees of member organizations may participate in working groups, interest groups, coordination groups, workshops and symposia. However, membership costs $57,500 per year, or $5750 per year for non-profit and governmental organizations, for companies with revenue of less than US$50 million and is Salter: Colonization tendencies in the development of the WWW tenable for a minimum of three years. Members are also expected to provide staff for working groups and other groups. This not only acts as an additional membership constraint to the fees, but also means that those with greater human resources have greater influence. The result of this is that W3C membership is massively biased in favour of economically powerful interests. This disproportion is illustrated by a brief survey of membership, conducted on 13 May 2003. At this date, the 410 members of the W3C consisted of 305 commercial organizations, 10 organizations representing commercial interests, 28 governmental organizations, five commercial organizations working on behalf of governments, 38 educational organizations and 23 non-commercial organizations and advocacy groups. It is not the case that these organizational issues directly result in members forcing others to adopt particular standards. Rather, it is the general confluence of strategic interests among the majority members that threatens to dominate general development. Measuring this confluence is of course very difficult, but it is clear that the majority (commercial) members of the W3C have an overall ultimate interest in profit. Therefore, we must be aware that the 'natural' appearance of such capitalist relations as are encoded into the web may blind us to other possibilities. The following examples illustrate not only the demands of commercial interests on standards, but also, and importantly for the colonization of the lifeworld thesis, resistance to them.
The patent policy
Historically, and perhaps in accord with its stated desire to ensure open standards, W3C recommendations, software and much of the documentation had been in the public domain. However, until a patent policy was proposed in 1999, the W3C had never stated formally whether or not it would recommend patented technology for which fees would be charged. The patent policy proposal suggested that the W3C would allow companies to charge fees to users of its recommendations (standards) on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. There were a number of options for how the fees could be charged, including one-off payments by developers, or even per-use payments by developers and possibly end-users. It is perhaps unsurprising that the backers of the policy proposal, who provided the legal, technical and administrative personnel for the W3C Patent Policy Working Group, consisted of mainly for-profit companies, including Apple, AT&T, Fujitsu, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Microsoft, Nortel Networks, Philips Electronics and Reuters. Naturally, the proposal was intended to serve their interests and those of their shareholders.
Initially, the potential threat of the proposal to non-commercial forms of use was either unrecognized or considered to be unimportant. However, the idea of charging fees for using the constitutive structure of the web seemed New Media & Society 7(3) absurd to many users and developers. Indeed, many of the objections to the RAND Patent Policy (RANDPP) came from activists in the free software and open-source community. In fact, free and open-source software would have been a major casualty of the RANDPP. With fixed (nondiscriminatory) fees, free software and open-source 8 software for the web would be virtually impossible to implement, if it utilized recommendations covered by fees. On the other hand, if licensing fees were implemented only for commercial software this would be discriminatory, since they would be the only ones paying licensing fees. The interests behind the RANDPP assumed a for-profit business model behind software development. On this model, there would have been no way that free software developers could have paid licence fees while retaining the free software model. So, if the RANDPP had been adopted, it would have necessarily spread the commercial model to all recommendations. The commercial model would have colonized development and use.
The exclusionary measures in the membership and decision-making structure of the W3C meant that certain interests would not be considered. Although Eben Moglen (Free Software Foundation), Bruce Perens (Software in the Public Interest) and Larry Rosen (Rosenlaw.com for Open Source Initiative) were invited to participate, there were of course no participants from the poorer sections of poorer societies for whom the implications of the RANDPP would be intensified. Indeed, even these invited experts were only 'invited' under pressure from the user community.
Eventually, the RAND track was dropped because of a 'strong preference for RF [Royalty Free] Recommendations' within the W3C: [T] he Patent Policy Working Group believes that the RF license as proposed is compatible with all major Open Source licenses except the GPL [General Public Licence] . We are still working on GPL-related issues. (Patent Policy Working Group, 2002) This abandonment was mainly due to public pressure when the proposal was put forward for public consultation. The arguments of the open-source, free software and general web users seem to have convinced Berners-Lee, not least due to the threat to the legitimacy of the W3C itself. As Christopher Blizzard (2001) 
of Mozilla stated:
If there needs to be a venue where companies can get together and create documents that describe their patent-encumbered standards, they should do that outside of the W3C. The W3C should promote standards that are truly freely available. This would promote truly interoperable software and standards and would put the resulting technologies into the hands of as many people as possible.
Salter: Colonization tendencies in the development of the WWW Micropayments Another issue that threatened the current form of the web and noncommercial forms of use was the movement within the W3C, begun in 1998, to introduce micropayments systems as a standardized structural component of the web (see W3C, 1998) . Micropayment is the process whereby those who provide content are able to charge very low fees for others to access that content. Indeed, much of the interest in micropayments comes from companies wanting to make it easier to buy things at cheaper prices. However, web content and code has an underlying parity as digital information. Thus, arguments for micropayments for MP3s can be extended to cover all content and code. If people can use micropayments for newspaper articles, then they can for other content, such as for following links and could even charge for using standards or an XML schema. For example, a search engine may charge a minimal amount for each search, or perhaps instead of charging for the search, they could charge to follow the link (on the commodification links, see W3C, 1999) .
Even if micropayment standards were to be marketed as a method of allowing small ventures to raise revenue (presuming there is not a problem with the commercial juridification of all relations), whereby small content providers could charge search engines to link to their information and resources, micropayments would not enable the WWW to reflect the demand of users, but would merely reflect market power; those with the most economic power would be able to channel users to their content and restrict access to other content. The mechanisms for so doing would include not only those directly related to the web, including online and offline advertising, but in consideration of the broad scope of many internet companies, would also include the use of other media outlets owned by those companies, as described by McChesney (2002) .
In addition, although many advocates point to the cheapness of transactions, cumulative costs would hit the poor much harder than the wealthy, especially on a global scale, thus increasing the so called 'digital divide'. 9 Indeed, where many internet service providers are broadening access by charging a flat-rate fee, a system of micropayments may reintroduce metered access for content rather than physical connection.
Perhaps most significantly for the purposes of this article, micropayments would alter not only the form and content (in any form) of the web, but also people's expectations and relations to each other and to the content. Where the RANDPP was objected to because it would have prevented free development, a similar threat might emerge from the system of micropayment: in the long term, the irresistible logic of monetization may discourage anyone from producing free content or code. Thus, the status of content would change; content would become commodified and associated costs would rise generally as a result of this commodification. This process of New Media & Society 7(3) commodification would add to the legal restrictions (content-as-property) on using the affordances of the WWW mentioned above, further limiting Berners-Lee's (1999) vision of the web as a network of information of varying quality linked together and made widely available via hyperlinks, framing and so forth. Not only could the standardization of micropayments colonize the use of the web, but also the programming language itself, for it too is content. The micropayments issue, along with the more general ecommerce activity of the W3C (which is arguably the spur for their trust and privacy-related projects), again illustrates the orientation of the W3C towards the imperatives of the economic system against those of the lifeworld. In fact, this issue is a clear instantiation of the commodification of relations that transforms the citizen into the consumer, another of Habermas' indications of a colonization. Indeed, without inclusive decisionmaking in the W3C, serious questions about the limitations to the application of micropayments went unaddressed. Alternative juridification, which would address questions of the barriers to charging and how public service or public good provisions can be maintained, cannot be fully addressed with such skewed power relations within the W3C.
The W3C's working group on micropayments has now ceased to be. The stated reason for this is that there was a lack of interest in actually implementing the technology, rather than because of any ethical or political objections to the implementation. Unlike the patent policy, micropayments attracted very little critical interest. 10 However, this is not to say that the idea of micropayments is dead, as research is being continued by a number of other private companies and, rather more controversially, by the Internet Engineering Task Force. The point is that the problem of juridification of commercial relations into the basic structure of the web stems from the imbalance of interested and potentially interested parties. The issues raised by RANDPP and micropayments lead us to the question of the impact of the demands made on standards organizations by the various member organizations and the issue of restricting the participation of non-members. Of course, the former have interests that the structure of the W3C (notwithstanding the benign dictatorship) becomes encoded into the structure of the web.
CONCLUSIONS
The above examples illustrate how capitalist social relations, specifically property relations, impress themselves on technologies. The article has raised questions also over the utility of Habermas' theory. The colonization of the lifeworld thesis is premised on the idea that there is the possibility of noncapitalist social relations. It is this purpose, to imagine (and practise) something different, that Habermas assigns to the lifeworld. It is for this purpose that Habermas (1979) trades the mode of production for what Salter: Colonization tendencies in the development of the WWW Poster (1984) calls the mode of information. The colonization tendencies facing the web are premised on the tension between the capitalist system and the lifeworld. The conflict at the W3C embodied resistance, in which another way of relating was articulated, against the imperatives of capital; perhaps an instance of technicians embodying emancipatory interests. Ultimately, however, no such organization would orient itself so as to fundamentally threaten capitalist social relations or the mode of producing things that they enable. Indeed, if we are to consider the incorporation of values in any technology it should be surprising neither that commercial values are most efficient with the broader capitalist system, nor that they should dominate. On this analysis, there is no lifeworld outside capitalist social relations of production to colonize, as the former is always already defined in relation to the latter. However, although social relations of production may not be fundamentally challenged, various non-affirmative relations may be taken up. Further to this, not all relations must be directly supportive of simple capitalist relations such as profit. Indeed, it is Habermas ' (1996) contention that certain institutional and non-institutional configurations of discourse may enable more inclusive, ethical and just decision-making. Perhaps it is thus that bodies such as the W3C should be judged; that is, by the absence of administrative and economic power and its accord with formal discourse ethics (Habermas, 1987 (Habermas, , 1990 .
Despite proclamations that it is acting in the interests of all users, the W3C can only be sure of this if it is able to know what these interests are. Of course, these interests can only be known if expressed in open and equal dialogue with the public. The W3C uses public consultations on most of its standards issues, but in addition to the concern about the strength and representativeness of such feedback, there is also a prior concern about what media analysts referred to as agenda setting: who has the power to launch issues onto the agenda in the first place.
Even if standards organizations such as the W3C or the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) can resist colonization, this resistance is tempered by the ability of companies to simply bypass these standards bodies, as has been threatened on numerous occasions. It is for this reason that we can talk of 'systematic' colonization. For example, in addition to the fact that Microsoft's Internet Explorer has a near-monopoly in the browser market, at the time of writing, the emerging alternative to an open internet is Microsoft's.NET project, a subscriptiononly network project whereby Microsoft software products will be tailored for specific Microsoft network applications and vice-versa. Where the Microsoft applications are developed, enabled content may not be accessible without the former. While on private networks, this is not inappropriate, when considering the location of Internet (not .NET) Explorer in the New Media & Society 7(3) browser market, there is a ready threat that there may be channelling of internet users to this proprietary network.
It might be objected that there is something wrong with 'railing away' at private companies or at 'enterprise' itself, but a serious problem develops when they involve themselves in regulating behaviour by imposing standards, codes or laws which prevent those with other interests from using the technology. Consequently, there is a need to consider how these bodies might address the question of representation in decision-making processes.
To this end, it might well be time to press for reforms in the governance of the WWW and internet. The European Commission helped set up and finance the W3C which, in a similar way in which the public funding of the internet fuels arguments for public interest innovations, may be used to justify calls for the stronger representation of the public interest at the W3C. In addition, those who are interested in democratizing technological development might begin by pressuring national governments, regional and international organizations and pressure groups themselves to join or otherwise get involved in the W3C or, if necessary, develop alternative standards. Without the interests of civil society actually being involved in the development process, it is unlikely that they will gain representation beyond their utility to other-order interests. This might lead to the development of web technology solely for commercial interests, leaving non-commercial forms of use decidedly on the periphery. It is through inclusive democratic structures that we can argue for code and standards that do not merely reflect profitability, but encode other sources of value, such as the public good and cultural integrity, not to mention factoring in alternative approaches to concepts of property. Such alternative approaches have been outlined most clearly by Lawrence Lessig (1999) and Itrona and Nissenbaum (2000) .
Generally, taking into account Habermas' understanding of juridification as Janus-faced, we might consider the reassertion of inclusive governance in standards bodies by taking more time to understand how this might be modelled. Perhaps a pluralist governance model may be acceptable, with government funds or funds from intergovernmental or regional organizations being made available to non-commercial groups in order to assist the formulation and articulation of their needs. Such a model may include equal representation of government, business, non-commercial, educational, trade union, citizen and advocacy organizations. In this way, the tendency for business capital to use the web in order to reproduce itself would not be abolished as such, but would be contained and prevented from 'pushing out' other forms of use. Already existing notions of public service can be transferred to standards developments as part of a broader social policy of communication rights, as also laid out in existing provisions such as Article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, which relates to Salter: Colonization tendencies in the development of the WWW free expression and the right to receive and impart information. In fact, most western states have some form of 'inclusive' information policy that aims to include all citizens in the information age (for example, the European Union's 'e-Europe -An information society for all' and the United States Government's information society initiatives). All of these programmes note the importance of technical competency (or electronic or information literacy), but they do so in largely in relation to industrial policy and using pre-existing technologies as employment tools or developing new ones for economic activity. However, unless the technological structure is engaged and developed in accord with the needs of citizens and their diverse societies and cultures, the more general pathological effects of one-sided juridification identified by Habermas (1987) , whereby social relations are steered by instrumental relations of efficiency, and social life is thereby stripped of normative and ethical content, will increase.
1 'Affordances' is a concept introduced by James Gibson's (1977) 
